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involve oneself in some of the quixotic attempts to explain the human scientific 
enterprise in a nutshell through a hodgepodge of ideas drawn from the social 
sciences, psychology, and other disciplines. Therefore, Professor Toomer de- 
serves to be doubly congratulated. First of all, he has provided historians of 
science with an invaluable work. Second, and no less importantly, he has by his 
example reminded us where the real tasks of historians of science lie. 
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Whitehead’s early life as a mathematician has been eclipsed by his later one as a 
philosopher-deservedly so, we might say, in view of the less distinguished na- 
ture of his work before Principia Muthematica. This first part of the first compre- 
hensive biography of Whitehead gives an account up to the end of his Cambridge 
years as a student and lecturer, just before the Whiteheads moved to London. 
During this period Whitehead’s mathematics publications consisted of three 
books from Cambridge University Press- A Treatise on Universal Algebra, with 
Applications (1898), The Axioms of Projective Geometry (1906), and The Axioms 
of Descriptive Geometry (1907)-and nine papers, only the last of which, “On 
Mathematical Concepts of the Material World” [Whitehead 1906], is explicitly 
philosophical. 
Neither those interested in his later philosophy, including his philosophy of 
science, nor those interested in the history of turn-of-the-century mathematics 
seem to regard Whitehead’s early mathematical work as worthy of much atten- 
tion. To further obscure this period for us Whitehead left very little in the way of 
letters, and nothing at all like a diary or other form of extended reminiscence. 
Perhaps only someone who has dedicated a good part of his life to Whitehead and 
Whitehead’s work-like Lowe, a student of Whitehead at Harvard who has de- 
voted 20 years to this biography-would even take UD the topic. 
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Though this review concentrates on the mathematical portions of the book, 
Lowe has excavated much additional information. He brings out the character of 
Whitehead’s school, Sherborne, describes the houses Whitehead lived in, and 
records memories of Whitehead’s Cambridge students J. E. Littlewood and A. V. 
Hill. He has pinned down the most likely possibilities for other, more uncertain, 
details, such as the personality of Whitehead’s mother, how Whitehead and his 
wife handled their finances, and the nature of Bertrand Russell’s relationship- 
some called it an affair-with Mrs. Whitehead. Lowe has such an engaging style 
that his book reads like a best-seller by Ronald W. Clark, whose biography of 
Russell Lowe cites. While each detail is given its due weight, we are never lost in 
details. 
The first volume ends on something of a cliff-hanger: in 1910, almost 50, White- 
head has resigned from his Trinity College lectureship, which provided his main 
income, and not yet lined up a new job. In the same year the first volume of 
Principiu Muthematicu was published, thanks to money from the Royal Society, a 
press subsidy, and the authors’ own pockets. Lowe concludes that Principia 
“increased Russell’s fame as a philosopher” while “it did nothing for White- 
head’s standing among mathematicians” and yet “Whitehead was the critical 
mathematician who developed and consolidated the ideas involved in Russell’s 
logicist thesis and (except for the theory of descriptions and the theory of 
types) took the lead in giving them accurate symbolic expression” (pp. 291- 
292). 
Lowe’s conclusions on the Whitehead-Russell collaboration are based on over 
60 Principiu-related letters of the total of 102 letters from Whitehead to Russell 
preserved in the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster. (Unlike Whitehead, 
Russell kept such things.) A detailed study of the writing of Principiu has yet to be 
made. Lowe’s account of Russell and Whitehead, which takes up 3 of the 15 
chapters, admittedly relies heavily on other commentators and historians, mainly 
W. V. Quine and I. Grattan-Guinness, for critical analysis of technical matters. 
But it forms an excellent general introduction, well suiting his goals: “to show the 
character of Whitehead’s collaboration with his brilliant former pupil” and “to 
show how the future philosopher, Whitehead, was thinking in this period of his 
life” (p. 276). 
Lowe, always on the alert for signs of the future philosopher, makes the most of 
Whitehead’s 1906 paper “On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World,” 
referred to above, published during the writing of Principiu. This seems justified 
since Whitehead told Lowe in 1936 that this paper was the most original thing he 
had done. We could say that the future philosopher is seen in this paper and that 
the philosopher might have been considerably delayed if Whitehead had instead 
worked on completing Volume 4 of Principiu. The planned volume, on geometry, 
never appeared, but the signs are that its direction was quite different from the 
1906 paper. Though the latter combines Whitehead’s interests in geometry, sym- 
bolic logic, and Russell’s relational philosophy of the time, it is directed at some- 
thing with which Russell was no longer centrally concerned, and, in any case, not 
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so good at on his own: applied mathematics from a philosophical point of view, a 
subject Russell treated (though not calling it applied mathematics) in Part VII, 
“Matter and Motion,” of The Principles of Mathematics (1903). Whitehead may 
have been moving from mathematics toward philosophy, but it is a philosophy 
rather closely linked to theoretical physics, whereas logic was Russell’s first 
philosophical priority by 1910. This is one example of their divergence of inter- 
ests. I was particularly intrigued by Lowe’s observation of a clear difference in 
modes of thinking which could underlie other differences: Whitehead claimed he 
had ideas and then groped for the best words to express them, whereas Russell 
described himself as thinking entirely in words. 
Whitehead’s two small books on geometry of 1906 and 1907 referred to above 
were published as numbers 4 and 5 of the series “Cambridge Tracts in Mathemat- 
ics and Mathematical Physics.” Lowe, who devotes three pages to them, believes 
that they should not be regarded as mathematical sequels to Whitehead’s Uniuer- 
sal Algebra (1898). He does not, however, raise the question of their relevance to 
Whitehead’s work on Volume 4 of Principia. Martha Harrell has pointed out some 
links between these tracts and Whitehead’s reports to Russell on progress on 
Volume 4, based on her comparison of their axiom systems and the forms of 
particular axioms [Harrell 19841. Since all of the big books on mathematics by 
either Whitehead or Russell, or both, were incomplete-besides Principia, both 
Universal Algebra and Russell’s Principles were originally intended to have an 
additional volume-it is not possible to draw sharp boundaries between them. 
Whitehead’s earliest mathematical influences can only be conjectured. Direct 
evidence of his motivations occurs first in his major mathematical work, Universal 
Algebra. The latter was primarily inspired by Hermann Grassmann’s Aus- 
dehnungslehre or calculus of extension, first brought out in 1844, and also by 
Boole’s algebra, first published in 1847. The general algebra of the calculus of 
extension underwent a major revival after Grassmann’s death in 1877 so that by 
1891 when Whitehead began his work on Uniuersal Algebra Grassmann’s work 
was seen as relevant to several branches of mathematics and was championed 
by such people as G. Peano and W. K. Clifford. Lowe describes Grassmann 
and how Whitehead probably came to learn about him, but it might enhance 
Grassmann’s relevance to point out that he was much more philosophically ori- 
ented than Lowe’s sources, including Whitehead, indicate. It is likely that White- 
head, like most other readers of the Ausdehnungslehre, was unaware of Grass- 
mann’s philosophy since it is only implicit in his writing and not easy to extract 
[Lewis 19771. But it had a Kantian and Hegelian context which could have been 
used to shed further light on Grassmann in the same way Lowe has aptly done for 
Russell’s early work. 
Influences on Whitehead as a student at Cambridge can only be described in a 
general fashion. Whitehead said Cayley, England’s foremost mathematician, was 
not one of his teachers, but he did know him, used to have lunch with him, and 
later became his friend when both were Fellows at Trinity. Lowe makes one of his 
many trenchant personal characterizations here: 
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Reading descriptions of Cayley the man reminds me of Whitehead: constant work, great 
modesty, perfect courtesy, and dislike of controversy. A considerable facial resemblance has 
been pointed out to me. You need only give Cayley’s nose a little aquilinity when comparing 
photographs. (p. 97) 
Lowe believes E. J. Routh was Whitehead’s coach and relies on descriptions of 
him by his students J. J. Thomson, Karl Pearson, and A. R. Forsyth. 
In later life Whitehead described his Sixth Form mathematics master as the best 
teacher of mathematics he had ever seen, “bar none” (p. 52), but not even Lowe 
has been able to determine who this was. The best he has done is to narrow it 
down to two good candidates: the Reverend Alexander Wood and John Blanch, 
both trained at St. John’s College, Cambridge. Lowe leans toward Blanch, “who 
later was unhappily married to Whitehead’s sister, Shirley,” and inexplicably 
committed suicide in 1907 (pp. 68-69). 
No important part of Whitehead’s mathematics, logic, or philosophy in the 
period of this biography is stinted by Lowe, and this, in conjunction with the fact 
that Whitehead never broke off a friendship, seems to have been liked by all who 
knew him, and to have had no enemies, might have added up to a dull biography. 
As Lowe puts it, “How can the life of so good a man be interesting?” Lowe has 
answered this question by giving the reader the opportunity to know Whitehead. 
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The content of this book is better represented by the subtitle than by the main 
title, which is likely to invite questions. The first question arises concerning the 
word “medieval.” Nowhere in the book is the word defined, although the reader 
will know from the contents that the period of the 8th to the 19th centuries was 
regarded as medieval. It is not easy to understand what marked the 8th century as 
the beginning of the medieval period in the history of Indian science, or why such 
